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Abstract This study tests whether the face-processing system of humans and a nonhuman primate species share characteristics that would allow for early and quick processing
of socially salient stimuli: a sensitivity toward conspecific
faces, a sensitivity toward highly practiced face stimuli, and
an ability to generalize changes in the face that do not suggest a new identity, such as a face differently oriented. The
look rates by adult tamarins and humans toward conspecific
and other primate faces were examined to determine if these
characteristics are shared. A visual paired comparison (VPC)
task presented subjects with either a human face, chimpanzee
face, tamarin face, or an object as a sample, and then a pair
containing the previous stimulus and a novel stimulus was
presented. The stimuli were either presented all in an upright
orientation, or all in an inverted orientation. The novel stimulus in the pair was either an orientation change of the same
face/object or a new example of the same type of face/object,
and the stimuli were shown either in an upright orientation
or in an inverted orientation. Preference to novelty scores revealed that humans attended most to novel individual human
faces, and this effect decreased significantly if the stimuli
were inverted. Tamarins showed preferential looking toward
novel orientations of previously seen tamarin faces in the upright orientation, but not in an inverted orientation. Similarly,
their preference to look longer at novel tamarin and human
faces within the pair was reduced significantly with inverted
stimuli. The results confirmed prior findings in humans that
novel human faces generate more attention in the upright
than in the inverted orientation. The monkeys also attended
more to faces of conspecifics, but showed an inversion effect
J. J. Neiworth () · J. M. Hassett · C. J. Sylvester
Department of Psychology, Carleton College,
Northfield, MN 55057, USA
e-mail: jneiwort@carleton.edu

to orientation change in tamarin faces and to identity changes
in tamarin and human faces. The results indicate configural
processing restricted to particular kinds of primate faces by
a New World monkey species, with configural processing influenced by life experience (human faces and tamarin faces)
and specialized to process orientation changes specific to
conspecific faces.
Keywords Face processing . Monkeys . Conspecific .
Perception . Tamarins
Humans rely heavily on visual recognition to interact with
other individuals. Our ability to identify each other by noting
differences in faces is a complex process normally taken
for granted. Its significance becomes salient in individuals
with prosopagnosia. This perceptual deficit seems localized
in the fusiform area in the right temporal hemisphere in
humans (Farah 1990; McCarthy et al. 1997). Because it can
be localized neurally, and because there is evidence of double
dissociations by which some patients can recognize faces but
not other objects, and others can recognize objects but not
faces, the conclusion is that there is a specialized system for
processing faces in the human brain (McCarthy et al. 1997).
Important questions that remain are whether the system is
specialized for faces or can be applied to other stimuli, and
whether it evolved as a hardwired system in humans, or
in many other primate species which share a similar social
world.
Within human studies, it seems that the unique aspects
of face processing extend to stimuli other than faces. For
example, humans experience an inversion effect in that we
cannot discriminate human faces as easily when they are
presented inverted rather than upright (Ellis and Shepherd
1975; Philips and Rawles 1979). Diamond and Carey (1986)
demonstrated the same inversion effect in adult humans who
Springer

126

acquired perceptual expertise for dog breeds, and Gauthier
and Tarr (1997) found activation of the fusiform “face” area
(FFA) in human subjects when discriminating “greebles”
after becoming “greeble” experts. Gauthier and others also
found that the FFA was activated in car and bird experts to
cars and birds (Gauthier et al. 2000). Taken together, these
studies suggest that the unique reliance on configural processing for faces applies to any well-practiced or extremely
familiarized homogeneous stimulus set.
If it is the case that the face-processing system is not specialized to process faces, is it still unique in the sense that it is
an innate system? Newborns tend to look longer at face-like
stimuli than stimuli with features not configured like faces
(Johnson et al. 1991). Within a few days from birth, infants
recognize their mothers’ faces (Pascalis et al. 1995) and by
3 months of age, infants show evidence of integrating facial features into a whole, rather than processing the features
individually (Cashon and Cohen 2003). Some have argued
that such evidence in very young human infants indicates an
innately specified face module in humans (Slater and Quinn
2001).
An alternative explanation is that exposure to faces in
early infancy tunes cortical networks to become specialized
for face processing. Developmental studies have shown that
6-month-old infants notice differences in the faces of monkeys and humans equivalently, but by 9 months of age, infants’ processing of faces is perceptually tuned to human
faces alone (Pascalis et al. 2002). With regard to humans,
then, face processing seems localized to a particular brain
area, but that area is most likely used to process highfrequency well-experienced stimuli (such as cars by car experts; Gauthier et al. 2000). Moreover, face processing is not
a purely innate system because it is cortically tuned by early
experience to show greater sensitivity toward conspecific
faces.
A possible explanation for the existence of a cortical network which develops an ability to process stimuli like faces
configurally is that we needed to recognize other humans
early on and quickly in order to survive in our complex social system. By this explanation, the cortical network should
be present in other nonhuman primates which evolved in the
midst of similar social systems that require early conspecific
identification to survive. A review of nonhuman primates’
sensitivities to faces, eye gaze, and orientation suggests that
the primate brain’s organization and primate intelligence
evolved, at least in part, to meet the demands of sociality
(Ghazanfar and Santos 2004).
If the face-processing system evolved to assist primates to
recognize salient social stimuli, then primates should show a
similar pattern of processing faces as do humans, including
(1) a sensitivity toward conspecific faces, (2) a sensitivity
toward particular configurations of highly practiced stimuli,
and (3) an ability to generalize changes in the face that do not
Springer
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suggest a new identity, such as a face differently oriented. If
adult primates from various groups show these similar characteristics of face processing, then there is indirect evidence
that the face-processing system evolved as a primate-general
cortical network to encode configurations that are experienced at high rates, not as a human-unique face module.
Research on face processing in primates has revealed that
neurons in the superior temporal sulcus of the inferior temporal cortex of macaque monkeys discharge specifically to face
stimuli (Desimone et al. 1994; Perrett et al. 1982, 1985). Recent evidence from single cell recordings targeted by fMRI
analyses has identified particular regions or “face patches” in
macaques that are predominately face selective and respond
less to body parts or to objects (Tsao et al. 2003, 2006; Pinsk
et al. 2005). Cells in these areas have been identified to respond to a variety of photographs of human and monkey
faces, and to respond differentially in response to repeated
exposures to specific individuals, changes in facial emotional
expression, eye gaze changes, and changes in facial orientation (see also Rolls 1984; Perrett et al. 1988; Desimone
1991; Gauthier and Logothetis 2000).
Given that face processing may occur in homologous brain
areas in nonhuman primates and humans, the next question
is whether their processing shares the same characteristics.
Gunderson and Schwartz (1985) found that infant bonnet
macaques recognized conspecific faces in a visual paired
comparison task, and Pascalis and Bachevalier (1998) found
a unique conspecific face-processing effect in rhesus monkeys in the same task. Gothard et al. (2004) found that rhesus monkeys increased attention to conspecific faces with
changes in expression, changes in identity, and changes in
orientation, and these results were unaffected by inverted
stimuli. Their results suggested that monkeys may be more
sensitive to conspecific faces but fail to process them configurally. In contrast, Phelps and Roberts (1994) tested squirrel
monkeys in a matching-to-sample (MTS) task involving face
stimuli and found an inversion effect to human faces. Wright
and Roberts (1996) found that monkeys showed a decrement
in performance when inverted human faces were shown but
not when inverted monkey faces were shown in a discrimination task. Parr et al. (1998, 1999) found that chimpanzees
showed an inversion effect to match human and chimpanzee
faces, but not for capuchin faces or for cars, whereas rhesus
monkeys showed an inversion effect to cars, rhesus faces, and
capuchin faces, but not to inverted human faces or abstract
shapes. Interestingly, they found a relationship between the
strength of the inversion effect and the number of trials of
training needed before meeting criterion, with categories that
required the most training showing the strongest inversion
effects. Taken together, the results from tests of the inversion effect argue for an inversion effect induced by extensive training or extensive experience with particular types
of faces. An important study which tested for inversions be-
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haviorally and without the use of extensive training found
that rhesus monkeys processed faces faster when the stimuli
were presented upright as compared to inverted. In the same
study, single unit recording identified patches of neurons in
one hemisphere which responded to upright faces faster than
to inverted faces (Perrett et al. 1988).
This study delineates the effects of past experience and innate ability on early processing of upright and inverted faces
in a New World (NW) monkey species, cotton top tamarins,
in a task in which expertise for particular categories was not
trained. Tamarins were selected because they are sensitive to
changes in face type (Weiss et al. 2001), they show sensitivities to the gaze direction of conspecifics and of humans to
find food (Neiworth et al. 2002) and they show longer looking to novel categories of animal types shown in pictures on
computer screens (Neiworth et al. 2004). Their attentional
reactions were compared to adult humans in the same task
so that processing similarities and differences would emerge.
The hypothesis was that tamarins might encode faces similarly to humans, as evidenced by a special sensitivity toward
conspecific faces and to types of faces for which they have
acquired extensive exposure in their life histories, but not
to faces of species which are relatively novel to them. By
testing a nonhuman primate species not often examined and
not closely related to humans in a task that did not involve
extensive training, the results test more directly any primategeneral aspects of face processing.

trained during the first phase that would affect the second
phase. Only 10 subjects were able to participate in the INV
condition due to the death of two subjects in the interim period (Mac and Dante) and thus the 10 subjects’ data were
analyzed across both phases.
The tamarins were family-reared and socially housed
in pairs or in family groups. The pairs were housed in
0.85 m × 1.5 m × 2.3 m cages, separated by opaque sheets.
The family was housed in a 1.8 m × 3.0 m × 2.3 m cage.
The subjects were on a 12-h light:12-h dark schedule and had
free access to water. Their daily diet consisted of a yogurt
and applesauce breakfast, a main feed of Zupreem Marmoset
chow, fruits and vegetables, and an afternoon protein snack
(e.g. eggs, hamburger, peanuts). Their care conformed to
U.S. standards for primate care, including USDA standards
and PHS standards for nonhuman primates.
Five of the tamarin subjects (Fozzy, Zhivago, Rolo,
Yohoo, and Caitlin) had been exposed to the following stimuli before this experiment: mirror exposure (Neiworth et al.
2001); full-body photographs of different types of animals
(Neiworth et al. 2004); gaze direction in human experimenters (Neiworth et al. 2002); and tracking food in an
object permanence test (Neiworth et al. 2003). The other
five subjects (Encore, Heron, Vulture, Quince, and Willow)
had not been in any studies involving pictures of stimuli before this one. None had been exposed to photographs of faces
of animals, including themselves.

Method

Stimuli

Human subjects

A total of 162 high-quality digital photographs of 12 different adult male humans, 10 cotton-top tamarins, 13 chimpanzees, and 21 objects were used as stimuli (see Fig. 1 for
examples of stimuli used). The tamarin, object, and human
photos were taken using a Canon PowerShot G2 camera.
Care was taken so that the tamarin subjects were presented
with faces of unfamiliar tamarins. The human adult faces
were unfamiliar to the human subjects because they were
of male construction workers on campus over break periods
or relatives of the experimenters who were not part of campus life. Two male faculty members were photographed and
included in the set in the INV condition. The chimpanzee
pictures were downloaded from various websites, including
the Georgia State University’s language project, the Environmental News Network, the San Francisco Zoo, and the
World Wildlife Federation, to name a few. Objects were photographed against a black background upright in a variety of
orientations. It was very unlikely that the humans in this
study had seen the chimpanzee or humans depicted in the
stimuli before this study, and it is certain that the tamarins
had not seen any of these individuals.
Photographs were converted to black-and-white images through a program called GraphicConverter (Thorsten

A total of 20 undergraduate students, 13 women and 7 men,
enrolled at Carleton College ranging from 17 to 21 years of
age participated in this study. None had worked or cared for
the tamarins at Carleton College, and none had any extensive
experience working with nonhuman primates. They were
randomly assigned to one of two groups, upright (UP) or
inverted (INV) testing. They received a $10 incentive for
their participation. A total of two subjects’ data, one from
each group, were excluded because the direction of looking
could not be determined on most of the trials due to their
head orientations. Results were based on nine subjects in
each group.
Tamarin subjects
Twelve captive-born adult cotton-top tamarins served as subjects. They were exposed to both conditions of testing, with
UP testing occurring first, and INV testing presented second. This design maximized the number of subjects whose
reactions were measured in the two conditions, and the reactions measured were attentional measures so nothing was
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Fig. 1
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Lemke, v.3.1.1). Pictures of faces were upright, showing
frontal face shots which varied by approximately 60◦ horizontally and 30◦ vertically. Orientation changes (OR) were
accomplished by slight shifts in the degree of looking by the
face photographed. INV faces were pictures presented 180◦
inverted.
The backgrounds of the photographs were filled so that
only the faces and some hair appeared against a black background in the visual image. Pictures were presented on a
17 in. color monitor through Microsoft Office × PowerPoint
on an Apple G4 computer. The pictures were scaled to
two different sizes as needed for their presentation in the
experiment. The larger-sized pictures, presented as samples in the procedure, ranged from 11 to 16 cm in width
and from 11 to 15 cm in height. The smaller-sized pictures, presented in pairs as test items, ranged from 6 to
11 cm in width and from 8 to 11 cm in height. Stimuli
were numbered and were selected per trial using a random number generator, and trial order within a session was
also randomly assigned. No stimulus was used for more
than one trial type in any phase of the experiment, although each trial type was presented twice to counterbalance for side (left or right) on which the novel stimulus was
presented.
Apparatus
Human participants were seated in front of a 17-inch monitor
connected to a PowerMac G4 which presented the stimuli.
A chair was positioned 40 cm away from the screen and at
a height such that the computer monitor was at eye level for
each participant and so that the camera recorded the subject’s
face.
Tamarin subjects were lured into a small transport cage
measuring 90 cm × 90 cm × 90 cm adjacent to their
home cage for daily sessions, and viewed the same monitor 10 cm from the outside of the transport cage. For both
species, a Canon VC-C3 Communication video camera was
centered above the computer monitor and connected to a
Sony VCR to record the face of each subject, including eyes
and eye movement, throughout each session. In the case of
the tamarin subjects, the camera was connected to a remote
system so that the animal could be tracked while it moved in
the cage.

 Fig. 1 Examples of different samples and pairs (including the sample
repeated as a member of the pair) used in the experiment. The left
panel shows orientation changes of the same face or object as the novel
stimulus of the pair. The middle panel shows novel individuals of the
same species or object type as the novel stimulus of the pair, shown in
upright (UP) form. The right panel depicts a novel individual in each
pair shown in the inverted (INV) condition
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Procedure
Both procedures were approved by the relevant college committees, the Institutional Review Board for the human subjects’ protocol, and the Institutional Animal Care and Use
committee for the tamarin protocol. Human participants
signed a consent form for participating after being told the
following:
The design of this study is straightforward and you will
not be required to answer any questions about what you
have seen or done. Because we want to study how you
process similarities and differences in pictures, we will
be videotaping you for later analysis. We ask that you
remain as still as possible throughout the session and
that you do your best to stay focused. You will first see
a yellow screen – when you are ready to begin, press the
space bar. You will be presented with a single picture,
and, after a delay, a pair of pictures followed by a green
screen. This indicates the end of the trial and you will
need to press the space bar again to continue. Feel free
to take a break if needed or to stop participating at any
time.
Sessions for humans and tamarins proceeded in the same
manner, with a few exceptions (including the instructions,
which were not read to the tamarins). For both species, the
stimuli were shown in Microsoft PowerPoint presentations
and each trial lasted 60 s. Each trial progressed as follows:
first, a yellow observing screen was presented for 2 s, followed by a click sound and then a single sample stimulus
was presented for 20 s centered on the screen. After the
familiarization period was over, a purple delay screen was
accompanied by a click, and remained on for 5 s. Finally, a
pair of pictures (accompanied by a whoosh sound) was presented for 10 s, with one stimulus of the pair being the sample
and the other, a novel stimulus. The trial ended with a green
intertrial interval (ITI) screen, accompanied by a whoosh
sound, which was presented for 23 s to the tamarin subjects.
We kept the ITI long for the tamarins to prevent proactive
interference between trials. Human subjects were exposed
to much longer sessions and so we allowed them to elect to
push the space bar during the ITI when they wanted the next
trial to begin. Most humans elected this option within about
5 s of the ITI.
The novel stimulus in the pair was from one of three
categories of change: orientation (OR) difference showing
a slightly different gaze direction orientation, individual
(IND) difference showing a novel individual, and a species
(SPEC) difference, showing a novel type (e.g., human–
chimp, human–tamarin, tamarin–chimp, or object–human,
for example). The paired pictures were vertically centered
and at opposite sides of the screen. The distance between
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the interior vertical edges of the pictures ranged from 9 to
15 cm.
In the UP condition, the sample stimulus and the pairs
were presented upright. In the INV condition, the sample
stimulus and the pairs presented were all inverted. This
insured that the familiarization occurred in both conditions
since the sample matched exactly one of the pair in both UP
and INV conditions.
The stimuli were presented in sequences consisting of 17
trial types, with 4 OR (orientation) changes, or 1 for each
category (tamarin, chimpanzee, human, and object); 4 IND
(individual) changes to test each category (tamarin, chimpanzee, human, and object); and 9 SPEC (species) changes
to test various combinations (i.e., with sample type listed
first and novel type listed second, human–tamarin, tamarin–
human, human–chimpanzee, chimpanzee–human, tamarin–
chimpanzee, chimpanzee–tamarin, and object – each species
type). These trial types were presented twice each in each
sequence with the location of the novel stimulus in the pair
switched to be on the left once, and on the right once. There
were a total of 34 trials in each sequence, and three different sequences were made for each condition (UP and INV).
The UP condition exposed the tamarins and humans to 102
trials. The INV sequence consisted of 10 trial types (4 OR,
4 IND, and 2 SPEC) presented twice each for a total of 20
trials per sequence. The INV condition contained an abbreviated version of the SPEC trial types; only two types were
shown (human–tamarin and tamarin–human). Again three
sequences of INV trials were constructed for a total of 60
trials in this condition.
The procedural differences were that human subjects participated in one session either of the UP condition constructed of 102 trials and lasting about 70 min, or the INV
condition constructed of 60 trials (INV) lasting about 42 min.
In pilot testing, we found the task to be somewhat tedious,
and in the case of the inverted trials, to cause some degree
of tension and stress in perceptual processing. That was the
motivation for reducing the length of session in the INV
condition.
To accommodate the tamarins’ short attention span within
studies, the tamarin subjects were exposed to six sessions in
each phase (UP and later, INV) wherein the three sequences
of trials shown to humans were shown in the same order
to tamarins. Each UP session consisted of the 17 trial types
presented once each, with two consecutive sessions constituting counterbalanced exposure on the left and on the right
sides and completing a single sequence of the trials. The INV
sessions consisted of 10 trial types presented once each for
a total of 20 trials across the two sessions which completed
a single sequence of trials for humans. In the event that subjects were found to look for less than 2 s in any one trial in
post hoc coding, more sessions were constructed per subject

Springer

Anim Cogn (2007) 10:125–134

to present those trials again in which the stimuli seemed not
processed.
Subjects’ looking rate toward the 10-s presentations of the
paired stimuli were downloaded from analog videotapes to
a digitized version through iMovie which allowed viewing
and coding at a rate of 30 frames/s. Coding was conducted
“blind” to the stimulus conditions because each coder could
not see the stimuli on the iMovie clips. The coders used the
auditory stimuli to determine the beginning and ending of the
10-s paired presentations. The coders’ definitions of looks
left and right required that the tamarin’s head and eyes or the
human’s eyes were directed toward the left or right side of
the screen. Because the camera was placed above the midline, a reference point was created readily. The accuracy
and reliability of look coding was tested with regression
analyses of two independent coders’ data. The second coder
randomly selected two subjects from each species and coded
two sessions to compare with the first coder. Regression
values for exact durations of looks to either side ranged from
r = + 0.77 to + 0.85 for tamarins, with a range of + 0.73
to + 0.95 for humans.
The dependent variable was percent preference to novelty
scores, which was the ratio of the amount of time looking
toward the novel stimulus of the pair divided by the total sum
of looks to both stimuli in the pair. Once we determined the
length of time the subject looked left or right on any given
trial, we mapped the looking times to the stimuli to calculate an averaged preference to novelty score per subject per
condition/trial type. Statistical analyses were a completely
repeated measures design for the tamarins, and were a mixed
model design for the humans. All tests were conducted with
a level of significance set at α = 0.05.

Results
Human preference to novelty scores
A mixed model analysis of variance (ANOVA) compared
humans’ preference to novelty scores to the repeated measure novel stimulus (OR, IND), the repeated measure stimulus type (tamarin, chimpanzee, human, or object) and the
between-group phase condition (UP, INV). The SPEC condition was excluded from the analysis because, upon further
inspection, humans always looked longer at a novel category
type that was different than the one familiarized, whether
it was a novel animal or novel object, and this effect minimized an examination of the more subtle differences within
face processing of primates and objects changed by identity
or orientation. The ANOVA revealed a significant main effect
for type (F(3, 48) = 15.60, p<0.01) and a significant effect
for the UP/INV condition (F(1, 16) = 5.37, p = 0.03). The
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The alpha level was adjusted to account for six comparisons between
the four conditions, or 0.05/6 or 0.00833.

Mean Preference to Novelty Score

a

80

human faces
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chimpanzee faces

objects

70
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40
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20
Human Subjects

10
0
Orientation

b
Mean Preference to Novelty Score

main effect of novel stimulus (OR/IND) was not significant
and none of the interactions were significant.
By Bonferroni adjustments for t-tests for six comparisons, the main effect of stimulus type was supported by longer looking toward novel changes in faces
of humans (mean = 60.93, standard error = 1.45) than
at novel changes to faces of tamarins (mean = 53.18,
standard error = 2.25; difference = 7.75, p = 0.008, adjusted α = .00831 ). There was no difference in preference to notice novelty between tamarin and chimpanzee
faces (mean = 54.49, standard error = 2.37). Human subjects noticed when objects changed (mean = 69.35, standard error = 2.21) significantly more than they did nonhuman primate face changes (difference from chimpanzee
faces = 14.85, p = 0.0001, α = 0.0083; difference from
tamarin faces = 16.16, p = 0.0001, α = 0.0083). The other
pairwise comparisons were not significant. The pattern of
results suggests that human face changes and object changes
drew more attention than did changes in the nonhuman primate faces. The finding that variations in objects were noticed
more than both species of nonhuman primates’ face changes
but not more than human face changes further documents
the particular salience of the human face to human subjects.
Figure 2a presents the mean preference to novelty scores for
human subjects by animal type and novel stimulus type (OR,
IND) separately for the upright and inverted conditions.
In terms of upright or inverted presentations, human subjects looked significantly longer at the novel stimuli overall when the stimuli were presented upright (mean preference = 62.59, standard error = 1.89) than when they were
presented inverted (mean = 56.39, standard error = 1.81), as
evidenced by the significant main effect of condition.
Independent samples t-tests were conducted to investigate
further the differences between the UP and INV conditions
within each stimulus type (human, tamarin, chimpanzee, and
object). Results indicated that there were significantly higher
preference to novelty scores to novel individual human faces
in the UP condition (mean = 71.6, standard error = 3.51) as
compared to the INV condition (mean = 58.41, standard error = 3.09; t(16) = 2.82, p = 0.01). In contrast, there was
no difference between the preference to novelty scores to
changes in the orientation of a human’s face when presented
upright (mean = 58.51, standard error = 1.84) as compared
to inverted (mean = 55.22, standard error = 2.27). The inversion effect was only statistically significant with novel
human individual faces; none of the other comparisons between upright and inverted primate faces or objects were
significantly different from each other.
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Fig. 2 Mean preference to novelty scores for human subjects (a) and
for tamarin subjects (b) to each of the face/object stimulus types to look
longer at the novel stimulus (defined either as an orientation or identity
change), and shown in the UP and INV conditions

Tamarin preference to novelty scores
A repeated-measures ANOVA examined differences in preference to novelty scores by the repeated measure novel stimulus (OR, IND), stimulus type (tamarin, chimpanzee, human,
or object), and condition (UP, INV). As in the case with
humans, the preference to look when species changed was
always high toward the new category type, and this change
obscured an examination of the subtle differences that occurred with identity and orientation change, so the SPEC data
were not included. The ANOVA revealed a significant main
effect of type (F(3,27) = 4.69, p = 0.009). The main effects
for novel stimulus (OR, IND) and condition (UP, INV) were
not significant. The interaction between stimulus type and
UP/INV was significant (F(3, 27) = 4.17, p = 0.015), indicating that some of the different species’ faces and objects
were treated differently in upright and inverted presentations.
No other interactions were significant.
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By Bonferroni adjustments for t-tests for six comparisons, the main effect of stimulus type was supported
by a significantly longer look rate to differences between objects (mean = 74.10, standard error = 3.12) compared to look rates to differences in chimpanzee faces
(mean = 55.91, standard error = 2.28; difference = 18.20,
p = 0.0001, adjusted α = 0.0083). Mean preferences to look
at novelty within humans and tamarins were intermediate
(mean for tamarins = 65.76, standard error = 1.65; mean for
humans = 66.00, standard error = 1.46) and were not different from each other, nor from the other two categories.
Figure 2b depicts tamarins’ mean preference to novelty
scores for animal type and novel stimulus (OR, IND) separately for upright and inverted conditions.
Paired samples t-tests compared preference scores across
the condition (UP and INV) by animal type to determine
the source of the interaction effect. In the UP condition,
there was a significant difference in preference scores to
novel orientations of tamarin faces in the upright condition
(mean = 76.06, standard error = 5.05) as compared to orientations in the inverted condition (mean = 55.68, standard
error = 2.59, t(9) = 4.161, p = 0.002). When the novel stimulus change was the identity of the primate face or object,
novel tamarin faces provoked significantly higher preference scores in the upright condition (mean = 71.23, standard error = 4.17) than they did in the inverted condition
(mean = 60.04, standard error = 1.75; t(9) = 2.49, p = 0.03)
and novel human faces provoked significantly higher preference scores in the upright condition (mean = 65.08, standard error = 1.10) than they did in the inverted condition
(mean = 58.84, standard error = 3.68; t(9) = 2.37, p = 0.04).
The differences in preference scores between upright and
inverted presentations of chimpanzees and objects when orientation or identity was changed were not significant.

Discussion
The experiment was designed to reveal similarities and differences in the face processing of primate faces for which the
subjects either had expertise, a potential innate advantage,
or not. Both tamarins and humans differentially encoded the
different face types and objects, and this was demonstrated by
significant stimulus type effects. For humans, novel changes
in objects and in human faces generated more directed looking at the novel stimulus than did chimpanzee or tamarin
face changes. This indicates that humans show a conspecific
advantage to attending to human face changes. This advantage may be due to attributes unique to humans for humans,
or it may be due to expertise acquired by humans to human
faces.
For tamarins, object changes were the most attentiongetting, and chimpanzee face changes drew the least directed
Springer
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looking toward novel changes. For tamarins, both human and
tamarin face changes drew intermediate levels of preferential attention to novel changes. Thus, tamarins show similar
attention toward both human and tamarin face changes, but
not to all primate faces because the chimpanzee face changes
generated the least amount of attention. Because tamarins
showed more sensitivity toward changes in both tamarin and
human faces, the sensitivity suggests an origin of expertise
rather an origin of evolved innate predisposition. The evidence does not support a primate-general module for faces,
because chimpanzee faces were treated differently than were
faces for which the tamarins had more experience.
The upright and inverted conditions tested for configural processing because stimuli processed configurally would
generate less attention to differences when presented in an
inverted manner. Overall, humans were able to note novel
changes significantly more when the stimuli were presented
upright as opposed to inverted, suggesting that many of the
stimuli were coded by humans configurally. But, on closer
inspection, the only significant change in encoding differences that supported this finding was if human faces were
used and identity changed, and under that condition, humans
showed a decrement in performance. Configural processing
seems applied uniquely to human faces to track identity by
humans. Overall, humans show a conspecific advantage to
attending to human faces changes, and humans encode human faces configurally to notice the identity of individuals.
Which stimuli do the tamarins process configurally?
There were significant decrements in noticing novel changes
when tamarin face stimuli were inverted, whether the novel
change was the orientation of the face, or the identity of the
face. This finding indicated that any tamarin face change was
noted more strongly in an upright presentation than in an inverted presentation. This outcome supports Gothard et al.’s
(2004) findings in macaques because tamarins also show a
hypersensitivity to subtle face changes in conspecific faces.
It is different than the Gothard et al.’s study in that tamarins
showed an inversion effect, whereas Gothard did not find
one. It is possible that with very brief presentations (1.5 s)
in the Gothard et al. (2004) study, monkeys tended to focus
on feature changes in the stimuli and thus did not process
the stimuli configurally. With 20 s of familiarization to faces
followed by 10 s in which the tamarins compared two stimuli with each other, they encoded the stimuli configurally,
and thus showed inversion effects. It is true that with human infants, short look times generate a focus on “local”
cues or specific features, while longer looking times typically generate attention toward “global” cues in which the
feature groupings are assessed (Frick et al. 2000). In this
study, with longer looking times provided, we were able
to tap into the configural processing strategies of tamarins
and found more robust inversion effects to conspecific
faces.
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Another notable inversion effect emerged in the tamarins
to changes in identity. For both human and tamarin faces,
when a novel human or tamarin individual was presented,
tamarins directed their attention much more to the identity
change in the upright than in the inverted condition. This
inversion effect did not occur to chimpanzee faces, so it does
not support a primate-general module for configural processing of all faces by tamarins. Rather, it supports configural
processing of both human and tamarin faces by tamarins,
most likely the result of expertise with human and tamarin
faces.
Taken together, the data suggest that tamarins use configural processing when noting the identity of faces of
species with which they have had vast experience. Tamarins
also show uniquely sensitive configural processing toward
tamarin faces in the sense that any change (orientation or
identity) to a conspecific is noted more readily in the upright
position as well. So, while humans showed a unique conspecific configural processing strategy toward human faces
to determine identity, tamarins show an experientially driven
configural processing strategy toward human and tamarin
faces to determine identity, and a conspecific configural processing strategy toward subtle changes in tamarin faces, including the orientation of the same face.
This interpretation brings together the disparate findings
in the literature, if applied more broadly. It is possible that
monkeys and apes show configural processing of human
faces and inversion effects to human faces because they are
expert at identifying humans. All the subjects in the prior
studies and this one have been exposed to human caretakers
throughout their lives, and thus have collected thousands of
encoded representations of human faces. The evidence from
this study suggests that such extensive experience can tune
the face-processing system to code human faces configurally.
It is also likely that faces of one’s own kind are processed
configurally either from extensive experience or from an
inherited system that is pretuned to the conspecific face.
This would explain why monkeys in other studies show a
conspecific inversion effect. A lack of a conspecific inversion
effect has been found in some monkey studies, and it may
be due to two possibilities: (1) short presentation times that
do not allow for configural processing to emerge or (2) less
extensive practice, which if necessary to produce an inversion
effect, would argue against an innate system for conspecific
faces.
There is also evidence of a conspecific-unique configural processing by tamarins, supported by the inversion effect
to orientation changes to tamarin faces. This indicates that
adult tamarins are rapidly encoding in a configural way gaze
direction changes in a tamarin face exclusively. Because this
particular aspect of face processing in tamarins is functionally different from face processing by humans, this particular
attentional strategy is probably not one that evolved from a
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common primate ancestor. Rather the conspecific orientation
sensitivity may be associated with the species’ ecological
niche and social organization, and thus may have evolved or
been maintained in this species to promote survival. It is possible that the tamarins have two routes of face processing of
conspecifics at their disposal—one that is a general-purpose
face/stimulus system that is tuned to configural processing
by experience, and one that is unique to orientations of conspecifics for survival. Because tamarins evolved in a forest
canopy, it seems likely that individual identification may be
accomplished by multiple routes, including auditory and visual input. There is evidence that cotton-top tamarins emit
individually unique long calls (Snowdon et al. 1983) and
they respond differentially to playbacks of different individuals’ calls. Cotton-top tamarins also live in small social
groups consisting exclusively of family members. Individual identification by visual means is probably accomplished
by early experience with a small set of individuals via a
general-purpose face/stimulus processing system tuned to
configurations of particular individuals seen extensively and
repeatedly. On the other hand, face orientation of another individual can yield life-saving information about food, about
predators, and about what actions that individual will take
next, aggressive, submissive, or neutral. Such encoding may
have evolved for conspecific faces instinctively and early on
in perceptual processing.
One may ask what has evolved if experience plays such a
central role in tuning face processing, and the answer is probably that configural face processing is the rule across species
of primates, but the function of face processing has evolved to
support different purposes for different species of primates.
A general-purpose processing system that can be tuned by
experience to identify individuals seems present in both humans and tamarins here, and is likely to be present in most
primates, given much of the past literature. Species-specific
responding to faces may evolve if a species responds to faces
at one level more uniquely than another to adapt and survive.
In the case of tamarins, a New World monkey species, where
a fellow monkey is looking, is just as important to encode as
is the identity of the conspecific.
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